The last research thrust for the Second Imperative consists of a series of Reports prepared by students at MIT that reveal the “state of the art” at the time (year 2015). These are compiled in one e-volume. The introduction Nazli Choucri and Chrisma Jackson illustrate the reasons surrounding ambiguity or absence of definition, as well as what might be some attendant implications.
Below is a brief note on each study, presented sequentially, with the author’s name. The entire set is available in Choucri and Jackson (2015).
An Abbreviated Technical Perspective on Cybersecurity
Ben Ze Yuan
The purpose is to provide a “platform” that serves as a foundation for understanding the technical functionalities essential for Internet operations and, by extension, the potential targets for threat or damage. None of the issues addressed are contingent on a definition broader than that of the strictly technical features. Whatever definition of cybersecurity assumes canonical status will most surely incorporate technical features. 
The Conceptual Underpinning of Cyber Security Studies
Liu Yangyue
This essay introduces conceptual issues that will, increasingly, feature into the cybersecurity debates. It is about the conceptual underpinnings of cybersecurity from the perspective of security studies. Today it is near-impossible to talk of national security without reference to threats in and of the cyber domain. This condition, driven by today’s imperatives, requires conceptual and analytical underpinnings if it is to assume a position of credibility in policy analysis or in broader theoretical contexts. Such is the challenge addressed in this chapter.
Cyberspace as the Domain of Content
Lyla Fischer
This essay focuses on cyberspace as a domain of content. By way of orientation, it differentiates between the ends and means of cyberspace so that policymakers can focus on the ends and experts can specialize in the means. This perspective has implications for emergent conceptions of cybersecurity, given that it is the security of content that dominates.
US DoD Perspective on Cyberspace
Glenn Voelz
The emergence of threats from “cyberspace” present new national security challenges for state actors, particularly technology-dependent nations whose political, economic and military powers are reliant upon information technology and networked computer systems. For these countries, including the U.S., the exercise of military power increasingly demands uninterrupted access to globally interconnected command and control systems, communications, guidance and navigation systems, intelligence-gathering platforms, and logistics networks.
Additionally, sensitive intellectual property and defense-related information residing in the Defense Industrial Base is vulnerable to these new forms of attacks, as well as industrial infrastructure and economic assets. In 2013, the Director of National Intelligence identified cyber attacks as the number one strategic threat to the United States, placing it ahead of terrorism for the first time since the attacks of 9/11.
These threats have grown in complexity as a wider range of actors engage in such activities, including “profit-motivated criminals, ideologically motivated hackers or extremists and variously-capable nation-states like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran,” according to recent testimony by the Director of National Intelligence.
China’s Perspective on Cyber Security
Liu Yangyue
This essay focuses on what China considers matters of cybersecurity and how it defines its key parameters. China has become an increasingly important player in global cyberspace. By the end of 2014, China’s online population has risen to 649 million, accounting for 19% of Internet users worldwide.
Chinese corporations in the IT industry have been active in making transnational acquisitions, providing services and content overseas, and enhancing technological competitiveness. In the international politics of Internet governance, China’s influence is also on the rise in recent years, as it seeks for greater participation and agenda-setting capabilities through multilateral institutions. So is its impact on security issues of cyber politics.
Given that great power politics has largely defined and shaped the scope and meaning of security studies, it is necessary to examine China’s perspective and stance on cyber security before conceptual and practical frameworks on this issue can be developed. So far, China has not published or clarified its national strategy on cyber security. However, several aspects make its perspective unique and may facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of cyber security.
Pursuing Deterrence Internationally in Cyberspace
Chrisma Jackson
This essay provides an initial mapping of the issues at hand. Labelled as a “discussion” of deterrence in the cyber era, this anaysis outlines some of the major features, or perhaps fault lines, in debates and deliberations.
Deterrence theory associated with warfare dates back centuries. In the Art of War, Sun Tzu said, “It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one’s readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one’s self invincible.” The concept of deterrence in the United States gained momentum and prominence during the Cold War. After the use of two nuclear weapons brought the end of World War II, the destruction and devastation demonstrated by these weapons brought deterrence theory into the forefront of U.S. DoD policy.
Deterrence theory is based on the idea of dissuading an adversary from taking action before a war has started. In 1959, Bernard Brodie stated, “A credible nuclear deterrent must always be ready, never used.”Later in 1966, Thomas Shelling highlighted deterrence as the “use of power to hurt is bargaining power is the foundation…and is most successful when it is held in reserve.” More recently, Graham Allison discussed the context of nuclear deterrence in the cold war: “…even during the most dangerous moments of the Cold War, a nation that attacked the United States with a nuclear armed ballistic missile would know that it had signed its own death certificate, since US retaliation would be immediate and overwhelming.”
Is Deterrence Possible in Cyber Warfare?
Brooke Gier
While it may not seem like it at face value, nuclear warfare and cyber warfare have a lot in common. Both exist in domains characterized by the security dilemma, offense-defense balance, and the urge for preemptive strikes. Both are unconventional and have the capability to cause enormous damage to a state. Deterrence – the aim to prevent an adversary from attacking with the threat of retaliation – was utilized as a strategic policy answer to the nuclear tension between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Similarly, deterrence seems like a viable option to prevent cyber attacks currently.
There are several problems with the use of deterrence, however. First, deterrence requires communication in order to work – the threat has to be communicated to the adversary, otherwise he will not know it even exists – and this communication seems to be unavailable during cyber conflict. Second, unlike nuclear warfare, cyber conflict has a range of severity – it can be harmless, or it can be catastrophic.
Thus, states lose credibility – another needed component of deterrence – to punish an aggressor when the aggressor has committed a “harmless” act because it is unreasonable to do so. Third, terrorist groups and individuals have the capacity to conduct cyber warfare, unlike nuclear warfare.
Thus, a rational actor – another need for deterrence – is removed. Despite these difficulties, state leaders do need to formulate an international agreement to address the cyber realm, so that in the case a cyber attack does occur, there is a plan to address it.
A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Interactions between Contemporary Transnational Activism and Digital Communication
Vivian Peron
This essay provides a major shift in focus, idiom, orientation, methodology, and inference space. It puts forth a theoretical framework for analyzing interactions between transitional activism and digital communication.
While the connection to cybersecurity may not be immediately obvious from this statement of focus, the fact remains that any cross-border source of cyber threat is, by definition, transitional in the strict sense of the term. At the same time, transitional activism refers to a form of political activity that is organized across borders without reliance on the role of direction of the state system.
For full text see, Choucri and Jackson (2015).
Reference:
- Choucri, N., & Jackson, C. (Eds.). (2015). Perspectives on cybersecurity: A collaborative study (ECIR Working Paper No. 2015-1). MIT Political Science Department.